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Research summary: While alliance researchers view prior partner-specific alliance experience
as influencing firms’ subsequent alliance or acquisition decisions, empirical evidence on the
alliance versus acquisition decision is surprisingly mixed. We offer a reconciliation by proposing
and testing an analytical framework that recognizes prior partner-specific experiences as
heterogeneous along three fundamental dimensions: partner-specific trust, routines, and value
certainty. This allows us to use a policy-capturing methodology to rigorously operationalize and
test our mechanism-level predictions. We find that all three mechanisms can increase the likelihood
of a subsequent alliance or acquisition, and in terms of the comparative choice between alliances
versus acquisitions, partner-specific trust pulls towards alliances, and value certainty pulls
towards acquisitions. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications
of our approach and method.
Managerial summary: This study focuses on an important corporate decision: When a firm has
had an alliance with another firm, how would that experience affect the likelihood of a future
alliance or acquisition with that same firm? We first suggest that it will depend on three factors:
the level of trust that existed in that prior alliance, the extent to which specific work routines were
developed, and the degree to which the firm was able to confidently assess the value of the partner
firm’s resources. We then find that trust is a particularly strong predictor of future alliances, while
confidence regarding value more strongly predicts future acquisitions. In this way, we demonstrate
more precisely how past corporate choices can affect (consciously or unconsciously) future ones.
© 2017 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The corporate decision to engage in alliances and/or
acquisitions has received significant research atten-
tion in the strategy literature (e.g., Vanhaverbeke,
Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002; Villalonga &
McGahan, 2005; Yin & Shanley, 2008), with
partner-specific alliance experience emerging
as an important predictor of both. Specifically,
Keywords: strategic alliances; acquisitions; prior ties;
alliance experience; policy-capturing; scenario experiment
*Correspondence to: Thomas Mellewigt, Freie Univer-
sität Berlin, Garystr. 21, 14195 Berlin, Germany. E-mail:
thomas.mellewigt@fu-berlin.de
© 2017 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
researchers have shown that firms with a history
of prior cooperation will be more likely to enter
into new alliances with each other (Chung, Singh,
& Lee, 2000; Gulati, 1995b); other researchers,
using real options reasoning, have shown that a
firm having prior alliances with a partner is more
likely to subsequently acquire that partner (Dalziel,
2009; Folta, 1998; Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 1999).
Similarly, researchers focusing on the comparative
governance choice (i.e., to ally vs. acquire) have
shown that partner-specific alliance experience
has a greater effect on subsequent alliance versus
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subsequent acquisition (Villalonga & McGahan,
2005; Wang & Zajac, 2007), while other compar-
ative choice researchers find that partner-specific
alliance experience exerts a stronger influence on
subsequent acquisition of the partner rather than a
subsequent alliance (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002).
In this study, we theoretically disentangle when
prior experiences are likely to lead to alliances
and/or acquisitions, and employ a policy-capturing
approach that is particularly well-suited for
empirically testing this discriminating logic.
Fundamentally, we move away from a reliance on
aggregating/counting prior alliance experiences and
move toward a disaggregated and mechanism-based
analysis that allows us to capture qualitative dif-
ferences in prior alliance experience.1 In this way,
we can more precisely build upon a growing body
of prior research that has tended to operationalize
different theoretical mechanisms while relying
on similar measures. For example, Villalonga and
McGahan (2005) refer to partner-specific trust and
argue that trust explains alliance over acquisition
choices. Wang and Zajac (2007) emphasize the
importance of partner-specific routines for problem
solving and learning. Finally, Vanhaverbeke et al.
(2002) and Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, and
Duysters (2009) refer to knowledge about the
partner/target firm’s operations and resources to
explain acquisition over alliance choices. Note
that these studies identify three different key
theoretical mechanisms, yet all use the number
of prior alliances with the partner/target firm to
operationalize their constructs.
Our intended contribution can therefore be sum-
marized as follows: We first address explicitly the
heterogeneous nature of prior alliance experiences
by considering three fundamentally distinct mech-
anisms (as alluded to above) that are likely to
influence governance choice: partner-specific (p-s)
trust, p-s routines, and p-s value certainty. We then
introduce a policy-capturing methodology to oper-
ationalize and test the effect of each of these three
mechanisms on governance choices. As we discuss
in detail in later sections, our choice of methodol-
ogy allows us to rigorously assess the differential
relevance of the three distinct mechanisms through
1 As Anderson et al. (2006, p. 102) suggest, a mechanisms-based
approach analyzes the “theoretical cogs and wheels that explain
how and why one thing leads to another.” Such mechanisms are
typically left implicit in broader theorizing, and making them
explicit generates a deeper level of theorizing.
which partner-specific experiences influence subse-
quent alliance and/or acquisition decisions.
What is Partner-Specific Alliance
Experience? Identifying Mechanisms
At first glance, it may seem self-evident that if
a firm has had prior alliance experiences with a
prospective alliance partner or acquisition target,
it would be in a relatively advantageous situation
(relative to a firm without such prior experiences)
in evaluating the prospective opportunity. However,
more careful consideration suggests that “prior
alliance experience” is not a simple, unidimen-
sional construct Indeed, Uzzi’s (1997) widely-cited
work on cooperation in the New York garment
industry suggests three elements of social structure
as particularly relevant in this context: “trust, joint
problem-solving arrangements and fine-grained
information transfer” (Uzzi, 1997, p. 42). Turning
to the alliance literature, one finds reference to
one or more of these three mechanisms when
discussing the effect of partner-specific alliance
experience on the comparative choice between
alliances and acquisitions, i.e. partner-specific trust
(Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Wang & Zajac,
2007), partner-specific routines (Wang & Zajac,
2007) and partner-specific value certainty (Van de
Vrande et al., 2009; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002).
We discuss each of these three below.
The Effect of Partner-Specific Trust
Akin to Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer
(1998), Bradach and Eccles (1989), and also
Uzzi (1997), we view trust – or more precisely
“partner-specific trust” (p-s trust) – as the focal
firm’s belief that the former partner intends to
deliver on made promises and would not act in
self-interest at the focal firm’s expense. P-s trust has
repeatedly been connected to the performance of
bilateral interorganizational exchange relationships
(Das & Teng, 2001; Inkpen & Currall, 1998).
Substantial literature contends that p-s trust lowers
transaction costs and supports value creation,
complementing governance relationships such as
alliances and acquisitions (Gulati & Nickerson,
2008; Poppo & Zenger, 1998), where the effi-
cient coordination of activities is crucial to goal
fulfillment. P-s trust increases the efficiency of
coordination activities because it enables open
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communication and straightforward, hassle-free
arrangements.
Therefore, p-s trust speeds up negotiations,
enhances conflict resolution (Currall & Inkpen,
2002; Das & Teng, 1998; Gulati & Nickerson,
2008), facilitates knowledge transfer (Mesquita,
Anand, & Brush, 2008; Van Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles,
2008) and counters appropriability concerns by
reducing the fear of opportunistic hold-up (Dekker,
2004; Gulati, 1995a) Accordingly, p-s trust also
facilitates organizational integration (Stahl, Lars-
son, Kremershof, & Sitkin, 2011; Valliere, Ni, &
Wise, 2008). In sum, we suggest that p-s trust is
conducive to interorganizational exchange; thus,
we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The greater the level of
partner-specific trust, the greater the likelihood
of either a subsequent alliance or acquisition (vs.
no future cooperation).
Regarding the comparative choice between
alliances and acquisitions we see several factors
that would suggest that p-s trust influences the
transaction value equation in favor of alliances.
First, p-s trust unhinges the ubiquitous threat of
opportunism and therewith lowers the relative
advantage of a hierarchical control structure as
described by Williamson (1981, 1991), thus that
full control by means of acquiring the partner/target
appears less necessary (Nooteboom, Berger, &
Noorderhaven, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone,
1998).
Complementing the transaction cost perspective,
we contend that the benefits of p-s trust in terms of
joint value creation are relatively more important to
alliances. Since alliances do not offer recourse to
authority and fiat, value creation and productivity
in alliances depend all the more on engaged collab-
oration and knowledge integration (J. Li, Zhou, &
Zajac, 2009). While p-s trust is clearly beneficial to
acquisition processes too, e.g., during negotiations,
due diligence, and integration, its positive impact is
limited because hierarchical organization and own-
ership constrain what p-s trust can do (Gulati &
Nickerson, 2008; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997) and
potentially even crowd out relational benefits (J.
Li et al., 2009). In sum, we argue that p-s trust
is, while being conducive to alliances and acqui-
sitions, especially valuable in alliances. Thus, we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): The greater the level of
partner-specific trust, the greater the likelihood
of a subsequent alliance versus an acquisition.
The Effect of Partner-Specific Routines
A second fundamental dimension upon which
partner-specific alliance experience can differ
significantly involves whether or not the expe-
rience involved (i.e., relied upon or generated)
partner-specific routines. Consistent with Cohen
and Bacdayan (1994) and Feldman and Pentland
(2003) we view routines as patterned sequences
of skilled actions that involve multiple, inter-
dependent actors. More specifically, we focus
on partner-specific routines (p-s routines), i.e.,
stable patterns of interaction between the focal
firm and the partner/target firm. P-s routines
store experiences of “how things are done” (e.g.,
connecting to the partner/target’s operations,
management systems, and procedures efficiently),
which operate like mutually accepted heuristic
guidelines of what actions are to be taken in
a specific situation (Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002;
Nelson & Winter, 1982). P-s routines contribute
to bilateral exchange by providing: faster decision
making due to lower ambiguity in the interpretation
of information regarding patterns of interaction
(Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994); higher reliability of
outcomes (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994); and greater
comfort in interaction and the ability to learn
from the partner/target (Becker, 2004; Hoang &
Rothaermel, 2005). Consequently, p-s routines are
a means of coordinating interdependent activities
at comparatively low costs (Hoang & Rothaermel,
2005; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Zollo, Reuer, &
Singh, 2002), and reflect a functioning interorga-
nizational infrastructure between focal firm and
partner/target firm which alleviates issues of con-
cern for both alliances (Arikan & McGahan, 2010;
Carayannopoulos & Auster, 2010; Gulati, 1995a;
Villalonga & McGahan, 2005) and acquisitions (N.
Li, Boulding, & Staelin, 2010; Vanhaverbeke et al.,
2002). Therefore:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the level of
partner-specific routines, the greater the likeli-
hood of either a subsequent alliance or acquisi-
tion (vs. no future cooperation).
Regarding the effect of p-s routines on the com-
parative choice between alliances and acquisitions,
© 2017 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 38: 2353–2369 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
2356 T. Mellewigt et al.
prior work provides two opposing lines of argu-
mentation, neither of which has been addressed
empirically. The first line of argumentation con-
tends that p-s routines increase the focal firm’s
desire for effective safeguarding by means of more
hierarchical governance (Santoro & McGill, 2005).
This is motivated by the fact that these routines are
alliance-specific and not tradable, which exposes
partners to opportunism through hold-up or hag-
gling (Santoro & McGill, 2005). This argument sug-
gests that p-s routines do not necessarily coincide
with a substantially growing feeling of trust towards
the partner/target firm. Once the inner workings of
the focal firm are unveiled to the partner/target firm,
opportunistic hold-up might in fact become easier.
Thus, functioning routine-based structures could
result in unintended knowledge transfer between
firms, increasing the motivation to install proper
safeguarding and thus preferring to acquire instead
of ally.
However, a second line of argumentation empha-
sizes that p-s routines offer an incentive to recre-
ate the context of their creation (i.e., keeping the
modus operandi constant) in order to effectively
reuse most of the gained capabilities (Anand &
Khanna, 2000; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Zollo
& Reuer, 2010). Thus p-s routines increase the like-
lihood of entering into a new alliance. Given the
lack of a clear theoretical argument regarding the
comparative choice of alliance versus acquisition,
we forbear formulating a hypothesis.
The Effect of Partner-Specific Value Certainty
Our third dimension upon which we see hetero-
geneity in partner-specific alliance experience
involves what we term p-s value certainty, which
captures whether the prior alliance has led to
a substantial accumulation of critical, private,
partner-specific knowledge. This can encompass
knowledge as to the partner’s strengths and weak-
nesses, compatibility of goals, strategy, structure,
manufacturing skills and operations, technologies,
quality standards and aspirations, as well as cul-
ture (Al-Laham, Schweizer, & Amburgey, 2010;
Porrini, 2004; Valliere et al., 2008; Wang & Zajac,
2007).2
2 Parter-specific value certainty is related to the concept of infor-
mation asymmetry. Whereas the latter stresses that partners have
different (levels of) information and may use their advantages
opportunistically, the p-s value certainty construct simply assumes
Both alliances and acquisitions benefit from
exclusive insights into the partner/target firm. This
knowledge is applicable to future exchange rela-
tionships with the same firm in helping to overcome
valuation difficulties (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993;
Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010) and increase
exchange efficiency (K. J. Mayer & Argyres, 2004;
Wang & Zajac, 2007). A deep understanding of the
partner-specific complementarities is critical to cre-
ating relational rents with the partner/target firm
(Dyer & Singh, 1998; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, &
Ireland, 2001). Generally, the presence of sufficient
critical information should facilitate both modes of
governance. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The greater the level of
partner-specific value certainty, the greater the
likelihood of either a subsequent alliance or
acquisition (vs. no future cooperation).
With regards to the impact of p-s value certainty
on the comparative choice between alliances and
acquisitions, we expect that the positive effect of
p-s value certainty will be stronger for acquisitions,
thus increasing the likelihood of acquisition over
alliance in a future relationship. Information about
the true value and characteristics of a target firm
effectively can mitigate the risk that some scholars
identify as the most significant concern in acquisi-
tions; namely, the largely irreversible commitment
of resources to a potential “lemon” (Balakrishnan
& Koza, 1993; Folta, 1998). The possession of
inside information on the actual value of the part-
ner/target firm’s resources alleviates the challenge
of finding a fair and appropriate purchase price
with the partner/target firm and also diminishes the
fear of adverse selection (Balakrishnan & Koza,
1993; Hoffmann & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001). In
addition, it can substantially facilitate and shorten
the time needed for due diligence processes as well
as integration (Al-Laham et al., 2010; Harrison
et al., 2001; Porrini, 2004).
By contrast, in a future alliance the partners
would work together in only certain parts of
the value chain (marketing, production, R + D),
where the downside risk is much smaller than
would be in an acquisition situation. In sum,
the net value-differential provided by p-s value
certainty is larger for acquisitions than for alliances
that a firm may have more or less knowledge about the target firm’s
characteristics.
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Figure 1. The hypothesized effects of partner-specific
trust, partner-specific routines, and partner-specific value
certainty on governance choice.
Hypothesis 1a: 𝛼1, 𝛼2 significantly positive.
Hypothesis 1b: 𝛼1 > 𝛼2.
Hypothesis 2: 𝛽1, 𝛽2 significantly positive.
Hypothesis 3a: 𝛾1, 𝛾2 significantly positive.
Hypothesis 3b: 𝛾1 < 𝛾2.
(Van de Vrande et al., 2009; Vanhaverbeke et al.,
2002). Therefore, we posit that:
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The greater the level of
partner-specific value certainty, the greater the
likelihood of a subsequent acquisition versus an
alliance.




We chose a method that would allow us to observe
managers’ choices among governance forms in sit-
uations with different configurations of p-s trust,
p-s routines, and p-s value certainty. We used an
experimental scenario approach, which has a long
tradition in disciplines like sociology and survey
research (e.g., Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010; Aus-
purg & Hinz, 2015; Hox, Kreft, & Hermkens,
1991), management and organization (e.g., Agui-
nis & Bradley, 2014; Aiman-Smith, Scullen, & Barr,
2002; Graham & Cable, 2001; Karren & Barringer,
2002; Priem, Walters, & Li, 2011), and also strate-
gic management (e.g., Connelly, Miller, & Devers,
2012; Di Stefano, King, & Verona, 2014; Reuer,
Tong, Tyler, & Ariño, 2013).
Experimental scenario approaches comprise a
number of methodologies which in strategy are
often summarized as “policy capturing” (PC).3 In
3 We recognize that our study is a “paper people study” (Aguinis
& Bradley, 2014; Gorman, Clover, & Doherty, 1978), but decided
PC studies informants evaluate hypothetical deci-
sion scenarios (Aiman-Smith et al., 2002). Scenar-
ios are “carefully constructed description[s] of a
person, object, or situation, representing a system-
atic combination of characteristics” (Atzmüller &
Steiner, 2010, p. 128). They consist of a num-
ber of variables (also called cues or factors), and
the product of all levels of all variables deter-
mines the population of possible configurations. In
PC studies, like in factorial experiments, the goal
is to estimate causal effects from the exogenous
manipulation of the treatments (i.e., scenarios). PC
methods have advantages over secondary-data and
traditional self-report designs. Confined decision
situations provide high control and a good assess-
ment of reliability so that main and interaction
effects can be isolated and examined in greater
detail. The controlled manipulation of orthogonal
variables assures minimal multicollinearity. Fur-
ther, the indirect measurement helps to overcome
social desirability issues and is less dependent on
self-insight (Aiman-Smith et al., 2002; Karren &
Barringer, 2002).
Despite these advantages, Aguinis and Bradley
(2014) found that from 1994 to 2013 only a small
number of PC studies was published in strategy
journals (seven in the Strategic Management Jour-
nal). But strategy research has much to gain from
PC studies, because “they are more likely to tap
organization members’ theories in use (i.e., the
judgment policies they actually apply in practice)
rather than their espoused theories (i.e., the judg-
ment policies they wish to show to the world… )”
(Priem et al., 2011, p. 558). While we cannot give
a complete account of the PC methodology, there
are crucial choices in the planning, executing, and
analyzing stages of a PC study. In our case, these
choices relate to external validity, the number of
factors, levels, and scenarios, and the analytical
strategy. Our discussion also aims at providing gen-
eral recommendations for PC studies in the strategy
field.
Realism and External Validity
A concern with PC studies is their potentially com-
promised external validity. For example, it has been
argued that “in some high-stakes decision-making
to use the terms “experimental scenario” and “PC” approach
because these terms are often used in strategy, and the differences
are not decisive for our purpose (Aiman-Smith et al., 2002).
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scenarios (e.g., mergers and acquisitions), presen-
tation of hypothetical scenarios are not likely to
produce the same responses as when those same
situations occur in a natural setting.” (Aguinis &
Bradley, 2014, p. 559). First, however, as Highhouse
(2009, p. 554) has noted, attention should be “paid
to the degree to which the treatment manipulation
is valid, representative, and strong.” Strong manip-
ulations create strong situations (Meyer, Dalal, &
Hermida, 2010; Mischel, 1968), in which respon-
dents construe the decision context in the same way.
If researchers recruit knowledgeable respondents
and create a strong situation, the external valid-
ity of the PC study is improved (Karren & Bar-
ringer, 2002). Second, empirical evidence suggests
that reactions to hypothetical scenarios do in fact
resemble real-life decisions. For example, Wiseman
and Levin (1996) found that subjects did not dif-
fer in their choices when the consequences were
incurred or not.
To enhance the realism of our study, we crafted
consistent scenario descriptions and made sure
that experienced key informants were sampled.
We contacted 1,614 corporate development and
strategy managers via an online business and
career network (XING).4 Two hundred and thirty
experts completed the questionnaire (response rate:
14.2%). We guaranteed anonymity, which relative
to confidentiality comes with advantages regarding
participation, and minimizes social desirability
issues. We further employed a duplicate scenario
(Aiman-Smith et al., 2002; Karren & Barringer,
2002) to check whether the respondents were
consistent in their answers. The analysis yielded
a test-retest correlation of .60 (contingency coef-
ficient), which lead us to continue with only those
respondents who had provided identical answers
to the scenario and its duplicate. The final sample
consisted of 160 experts (75.6% male, 24.4%
female), with a mean of 13.8 years of professional
experience (median: 13 years) and 3.5 years of
acquisitions and alliances experience (median:
3 years). A majority (72%) had management posi-
tions (low, middle, or top-managers). Respondents
came from a variety of industries, with no particular
pattern of distribution.5
4 XING is a German business network that competes with
LinkedIn, among others; see https://www.xing.com/.
5 These were Automotive, Aviation, Biotech, Engineering, Con-
sulting, Financial Services and Insurance, Logistics, Media, IT
and Telecommunications, Medical, Pharma, Chemical and Public
Services.
Questionnaire
The online questionnaire had five parts.6 The first
part described the decision context. Prior to the
main study, the description was validated with a
panel of managers and academics to make sure that
it represented a realistic choice situation using the
common terms and examples as adopted in manage-
rial practice. The description provided the histori-
cal background to the current situation, the decision
purpose, and instructions for the completion of the
questionnaire (Cooksey, 1996). We told the respon-
dents that they worked for a company as the head
of the corporate development department. The com-
pany pursued several growth projects for which they
had to decide whether the resources of a hypothet-
ical partner firm should be accessed via an alliance
or acquisition. These partner firms were known to
the focal firm from prior alliances, offered compat-
ible and strategically critical resources, and were
based in the German speaking economic area. We
also assured that the focal firm’s financial capacity
allowed for both alliance and acquisition.
The second part defined the terms “alliance” and
“acquisition” and provided an example scenario to
avoid misinterpretations and reduce start-up effects
(Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). The third part consisted
of 12 scenarios and one duplicate. Each scenario
was presented on a single page, and the 12 scenarios
were presented in random order to avoid order
effects (Aiman-Smith et al., 2002). In the fourth
part we surveyed individual-level controls. The fifth
part consisted of some manipulation checks, which
allowed us to verify whether the manipulation was
successful and as strong as expected. All texts
were provided in German (we present our own
translations here).
Experimental Measures
A critical question with PC studies is how many
factors and levels per factor to use. A PC study
should employ the most salient and important causal
drivers for the decision context of interest (Aguinis
& Bradley, 2014; Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010), and
to identify these, both theoretical and practical
knowledge is needed. Since too many factors create
large amounts of complexity, we decided to stop at
five factors (Aiman-Smith et al., 2002). These were
the variables from our theory (p-s routines, p-s trust,
6 We provide screenshots on request.
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and p-s value certainty) plus market uncertainty
and asset specificity. We included the latter two
because they have established theoretical links with
interfirm cooperation decisions (Williamson, 1985).
Like traditional control variables, they were used to
isolate the p-s variables effects which are potentially
confounded with uncertainty and asset specificity
effects.
The wording of the variables is essential for a
successful experimental manipulation. It requires a
balancing act between consistency with established
measures in academic literature and creating a
hands-on environment that is reflective of the key
informants’ knowledge. During iterative feedback
processes with our expert panel, we determined
the essential key words and final wordings which
resulted in short texts of one or two sentences
depicting each level of every factor. In the case
of “p-s trust” we relied on Rousseau et al. (1998),
R. C. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) and
Zaheer et al. (1998); the goal was to create a sense
of accepted vulnerability and positive behavioral
expectations on the side of the respondents. With
respect to “p-s routines” we relied on the definitions
by Feldman and Pentland (2003) and Becker (2004)
to describe how partner-specific alliance experience
did or did not result in stable patterns of interaction,
for example with regard to communication, conflict
resolution, and decision-making. The levels of “p-s
value certainty” were based on Balakrishnan and
Koza’s (1993) ideas but adapted to our context so
that they described whether or not the focal firm was
able to gain exclusive insights into the partner firm
(e.g., processes, business practices, capabilities, and
technologies) by means of partner-specific alliance
experience.
As noted above, to control for TCE concerns
(Williamson, 1975, 1985) we included market
uncertainty and asset specificity. Market uncer-
tainty had two levels (0 = low, 1 = high), and
asset specificity had three levels (0 = no specific
investments, 1 = unilateral specific investments,
2 = mutual specific investments).
Incomplete Block Design
Since the p-s variables and market uncertainty had
two levels each, and asset specificity three, a pop-
ulation of 3 × 24 = 48 scenarios resulted. There is
no clear recommendation regarding how many sce-
narios a respondent should answer. Some authors
argue that both too few (start-up effects) and too
many (fatigue effects) scenarios per respondent cre-
ate problems (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014; Atzmüller
& Steiner, 2010). In our context 48 scenarios per
respondent were considered too much. If partici-
pants respond to a subset of scenarios only (rather
than to the full set), scenarios can be selected
randomly, or an experimental plan can be used
for selection. Random selection results in a com-
plex random confounding structure (Atzmüller &
Steiner, 2010), whereas a fractional design based
on an experimental plan can be used to deliber-
ately confound selection with main and interaction
effects.
We decided to use an experimental plan and
employed an incomplete block design (Cochran &
Cox, 1957; Graham & Cable, 2001). In this design,
the population of scenarios is divided into blocks
of equal size, such that respondents reply to a
block of scenarios only. Since all blocks, and thus
all scenarios, are used, incomplete block designs
“require fewer scenarios per participant than full
factorial designs,” but there is no “loss of the
validity of the results generated” (Graham & Cable,
2001, pp. 28–29). For the last condition to hold, a
few rules must be followed. First, “The main effects
of a factor will be kept clear of block effects if every
block contains each level of the factor the same
number of times.” (Cochran & Cox, 1957, p. 203).
Hence, block size must be a multiplier of the factor
levels involved (6 scenarios per block, or a multiple
of 6, if factor levels are 3 and 2, like in our case).
As a compromise between too few and too many
scenarios, we decided to use blocks of 12 scenarios
per respondent. We present the experimental plan in
Appendix B).
Other Measures
The dependent variable is governance choice. We
asked the respondents to indicate whether the
resources offered by the partner firm were best
accessed via an alliance or an acquisition. As a third
option, the respondents could indicate that under
the given circumstances neither an alliance nor an
acquisition type of future cooperation was a suitable
option.
At the individual level we controlled for gen-
der, professional and governance choice experience
(both in years), and management position (no man-
agerial position, low, middle, top management). We
also controlled for managerial hubris (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Roll,
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1986) by capturing its personality dimension, that
is, narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). To
this end, we constructed a German version of the
NPI-16, a short version of the Narcissistic Person-
ality Inventory (NPI) (Ames, Rose, & Anderson,
2006). Finally, to achieve a balanced PC design (i.e.,
where each scenario receives the same number of
responses) blocks need to be assigned to individu-
als equally often. Since we excluded some respon-
dents because of missing test-retest consistency, our
design was potentially unbalanced, and we used
block dummies as a control (Atzmüller & Steiner,
2010).
Pretest and Manipulation Checks
Prior to the main study, a pretest was conducted.
In sum, 34 individuals participated in the pretest,
and 21 (18 full-time students from a major German
research university, and three employed individu-
als) completed the questionnaire. All participants
were German, and two thirds (14) were female.
All participants were encouraged to provide com-
ments which were filed and used to realize minor
changes in the wording, spelling, and formatting of
the survey. The pretest also lead us to include an
introductory sample scenario and a short cover let-
ter issued and signed by the principal researcher.
The average response time was slightly more than
23 minutes, including the provision of comments,
which we considered appropriate.
Prior and parallel to hypothesis testing, we con-
ducted some validity checks. At the end of the ques-
tionnaire, we asked the respondents to rank the five
experimental factors in terms of their importance
for governance choice decisions (from “1 – most
important” to “5 – least important”). Overall, p-s
value certainty received the highest ranking (mean:
2.19; median: 2), followed by p-s trust (mean: 2.71;
median: 3) and market uncertainty (mean: 2.74;
median: 2), asset specificity (mean: 3.06; median:
3), and finally p-s routines (mean: 4.3; median: 5).7
This ranking resembled the multivariate results dis-
cussed below; because the implicit decision pro-
cesses triggered by the treatments received support
from explicit rankings we conclude that the manip-
ulation of the factors was successful and operated
like expected.
7 Except for the p-s trust and market uncertainty means, all pair-
wise comparisons of means (t-tests) were statistically significant.
Exact results are provided in Appendix A.
Finally, we asked some further validation ques-
tions. An example item is “Trust enables the
efficient coordination of workflows with the part-
ner firm.” These control items were measured on
five-point rating scales (with “disagree – agree”
anchors) and correlated with the rankings of the
experimental factors. Overall, the correlational pat-
terns were theoretically sound and statistically sig-
nificant (e.g., the trust item and the trust ranking
were correlated with r = −0.40; note that lower
numbers mark higher trust rankings, thus the neg-
ative correlation).
Analytical Strategy
In our study, the level of analysis is the scenario.
Because each respondent judged 12 scenarios allo-
cated to individuals via a random draw of one of
four blocks, responses are potentially correlated
within individuals. We used the Intraclass Corre-
lation Coefficient (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) to esti-
mate the degree of data dependency. Across all
observations the ICC(1,1) was 0.11. When also tak-
ing blocks and scenarios into account, the ICC(2,1)
ranged from 0.11 (block 3) to 0.14 (block 2).8 The
analyses revealed that 11–14% of the variance in
governance choice was attributable to respondents
(i.e., person effects), and that 86–89% came from
the treatments. Thus, we saw that the manipulations
were effective. However, we also observed a sub-
stantial degree of data non-independence that we
needed to address.
The two standard solutions for such
non-independence are multilevel or Hierarchi-
cal Linear Modeling (HLM) (Hox et al., 1991;
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), which exploits a
random-effects strategy, or fixed-effects methods
such as person dummies (Di Stefano et al., 2014).
We decided to use person dummies for two reasons.
First, trading off estimation efficiency and sample
8 All ICC estimates (ICC(1,1) and ICC(2,1)) were statistically
significant (see Appendix A). For the ICC analyses, we made
the simplifying assumption that our governance choice decisions
may be arranged on a continuum from market (no decision for
either alliance or acquisition) to hierarchy (acquisition), with
alliance as the hybrid type in between. This allowed us to estimate
the ICC coefficients from a simple linear model. As a (more
complex and difficult to interpret) alternative, one could estimate a
(multinomial) logit model and partition the variance across levels
by assuming a latent random effect on level-1 with a standard
logistic distribution (where the level-1 variance is expressed as
𝜋2∕3 ≈ 3.29; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker,
1999).
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size characteristics, we concluded that with only
160 respondents (relatively small cross section) but
12 repeated observations per respondent (relatively
large number of repetitions), fixed-effects were
preferred. Second, we found some selectivity after
we excluded the non-reliable respondents. In the
reduced sample, we saw that the four blocks were
unequally distributed among the respondents,
which resulted in unequal distributions of sce-
narios as well. Given that the block effect may
be overshadowed by unobserved individual-level
heterogeneity (given the observed selectivity),
fixed person effects were our preferred choice.
Because governance choice (our DV) had three
categories, we estimated multinomial logit regres-
sion models. A dependent variable with three cat-
egorical outcomes requires the calculation of two
equations, one for each category relative to the ref-
erence category (Menard, 2002):
log
[
P (y = j) ∕P (y = J)
]
= 𝛽jX;
with j= 1 , … , J− 1 ; 𝛽 j=[𝛽 j0, … 𝛽 jm] and X=
[X1, … , Xm]
Accordingly, all J−1 probabilities can be
denoted as:







while the probability of membership in the refer-
ence category equals:







The final sample consisted of 1,920 governance
decisions from 160 key informants. We obtained
794 alliance and 642 acquisition decisions, and
484 observations with no decision for either one
of the two alternatives. Because our main models
employed person fixed effects, we did not include
the individual-level covariates in these models.
Table 1 reports descriptive information for all vari-
ables, and correlations among the dependent vari-
able’s levels and all independent variables (level of
analysis is the scenario).
The correlations reveal that p-s trust, p-s routines,
and p-s value certainty are all negatively related to
the “no decision” category of the DV. P-s trust is
positively correlated with alliances, and p-s value
certainty relates positively to acquisitions. These
results are in line with our expectations. Market
uncertainty is positively correlated with alliances,
and negatively with acquisitions, and the relation-
ships between asset specificity and the DV’s cate-
gories are small and rather negligible.
H1a states that p-s trust is positively associated
with the likelihood of both alliance and acquisi-
tion choices (relative to none of the two forms). As
shown in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2, the raw coef-
ficients are both positive and significant. Figure 2
illustrates that a change in p-s trust from zero to one
induces an increase in the average predicted proba-
bility of an acquisition outcome from 32 to 35%, of
an alliance outcome from 31 to 51%, while the pre-
dicted probability of “no decision” declines drasti-
cally. Similarly, H2 is supported. With p-s routines
moving from zero to one the predicted probabil-
ity of “alliance” increased by 9%. The associated
change in the predicted probability for “acquisi-
tion” amounts to 7%. At the same time, the pre-
dicted probability of “no decision” drops by 15%.
Further, our results support H3a suggesting that p-s
value certainty is positively associated with both the
likelihood of alliance and acquisition choices when
compared to no decision. Figure 2 shows that as
p-s value certainty goes up from low to high levels,
the average predicted probability of “no decision”
strongly declines, while acquisitions become much
more likely, and alliances remain relatively stable.
Model 3 of Table 2 is employed to test H1b and
H3b, which examine the differential effect of p-s
trust and p-s value certainty on the comparative
choice between alliance and acquisition. H1b sug-
gests that p-s trust has a stronger relationship with
alliances than with acquisitions. Model 3 shows that
the coefficient for alliance is positive and signifi-
cant, which is supportive of H1b. H3b argues that
p-s value certainty will encourage acquisitions more
strongly than alliances. Model 3 shows a negative
and significant coefficient for alliance choice, which
is in support of H3b. The differential effects of p-s
trust and p-s value certainty are nicely illustrated
by Figure 2 and further explained by the marginal
effects reported in Table 3. P-s trust has a strong
and significant marginal effect on alliances, but the
marginal effect on acquisitions is low and insignif-
icant. P-s value certainty predicts acquisitions, but
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Table 1
Correlations between the Dependent and the Independent Variables
Variable M s.d. GC1 GC2 GC3
Governance choice
No decision 0.25 0.43
Alliance 0.41 0.49
Acquisition 0.33 0.47
P-S trust 0.5 0.50 −0.29 (.00) 0.21 (.00) 0.04 (.05)
P-S routines 0.5 0.50 −0.20 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.08 (.00)
P-S value certainty 0.5 0.50 −0.23 (.00) −0.03 (.19) 0.24 (.00)
Market uncertainty 0.5 0.50 0.00 (.83) 0.19 (.00) −0.20 (.00)
Asset specificity
No investments 0.33 0.47 −0.01 (.79) 0.01 (.82) −0.00 (1.00)
Unilateral investments 0.33 0.47 0.03 (.16) −0.04 (.05) 0.02 (.47)
Mutual investments 0.33 0.47 −0.03 (.25) 0.04 (.09) −0.02 (.47)
Gender (male) 0.76 0.43 −0.07 (.00) 0.03 (.26) 0.03 (.13)
Professional experience 13.78 7.93 0.04 (.09) −0.01 (.80) −0.03 (.19)
Governance experience 3.52 3.65 0.07 (.00) −0.09 (.00) 0.03 (.26)
Managerial position
No management 0.12 0.32 0.01 (.56) 0.01 (.70) −0.02 (.35)
Lower management 0.16 0.37 −0.07 (.00) 0.05 (.02) 0.01 (.63)
Middle management 0.39 0.49 0.01 (.63) 0.02 (.49) −0.03 (.24)
Top management 0.33 0.47 0.04 (.10) −0.07 (.00) 0.03 (.14)
Narcissism 0.45 0.18 0.02 (.44) −0.01 (.54) −0.00 (.94)
Blocks
Block 1 0.24 0.43 −0.03 (.22) −0.00 (.95) 0.03 (.23)
Block 2 0.21 0.41 0.02 (.36) 0.03 (.20) −0.05 (.03)
Block 3 0.29 0.45 0.07 (.00) −0.07 (.00) 0.02 (.49)
Block 4 0.26 0.44 −0.06 (.01) 0.05 (.03) 0.00 (.87)
Notes. GC1–GC3: Categories of the DV (1 = No Decision, 2 = Alliance, 3 = Acquisition); P-S = Partner-Specific; N = 1,920;
M = mean; s.d. = standard deviation; reference category for gender is female; exact p-values in parentheses.
is insignificantly related to alliances. The marginal
effects are informative because p-s trust and p-s
value certainty have effects on both alliance and
acquisition choices over no form of interfirm coop-
eration, but the probability for either one category
depends on how all the other effects balance out.
Our analysis also indicates that p-s routines con-
tribute to alliance and acquisition choices over
no form of cooperation, but do not predict the
choice between alliances and acquisitions. More-
over, it is important to recognize that a realistic
decision context is not exclusively represented by
relational considerations. Market uncertainty has
positive effects on alliances, and negative effects
on acquisitions (in both cases as compared to no
decision), and also increases the probability of an
alliance over an acquisition. TCE traditionally sug-
gests a higher degree of integration when mar-
ket uncertainty is high. However, our findings are
indicative of real option considerations that have
already been substantiated in other contexts, as
for example by Folta (1998). In times of market
uncertainty, alliances might turn out to be a viable
investment option while minimizing downside com-
mercial risk (Dalziel, 2009; Folta, 1998). Asset
specificity, in our models, is virtually unrelated to all
governance choices. An explanation is that in face
of a reliable exchange history between the trans-
action partners, i.e., prior partner-specific alliance
experience, specific investments become less deci-
sive (Eckhard, Mellewigt, & Weller, 2009). All
potential covariate effects and person-based unob-
served heterogeneity were absorbed by the person
dummies.
In a last step we conducted a novel robustness
check. We tested for start-up and fatigue effects
by estimating 12 separate multinomial logit mod-
els for each of the 12 positions of scenarios in the
experiment. In other words, a model used all first,
second, third, etc. scenarios which the respondents
replied to. These models are potentially insightful,
yet some caveats apply: Because we cannot employ
fixed-effects in these models (since each individ-
ual is surveyed only once in each model), we used
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Figure 2. Marginal effects and predicted values.
the control variables described above; however, this
makes it harder to directly compare the estimates
across modeling strategies. Given the relatively
low number of observations per model, the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation of the multinomial logit
model may be problematic because its large sample
properties may be compromised. Along the same
line, the statistical power of these models is smaller
as compared to the models presented above such
that Type II errors are more likely. Finally, because
the scenarios were drawn in random order within
blocks, the models may contain unbalanced sets of
scenarios. We found that the simple main effects
(of p-s trust on alliances and p-s value certainty on
acquisitions) were reliably detected in all but three
(out of 24) instances. Moreover, later position mod-
els were slightly more likely to detect a significant,
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Table 3
Marginal Effects
No decision dy/dx (s.e.) Alliance dy/dx (s.e.) Acquisition dy/dx (s.e.)
P-S trust −0.22 (0.01) [−0.24; −0.20] 0.19 (0.02) [0.15; 0.22] 0.03 (0.02) [−0.00; 0.07]
P-S routines −0.15 (0.01) [−0.18; −0.12] 0.08 (0.02) [0.04; 0.12] 0.07 (0.02) [0.03; 0.10]
P-S value certainty −0.19 (0.01) [−0.21; −0.17] −0.03 (0.02) [−0.07; 0.01] 0.22 (0.02) [0.18; 0.25]
Market uncertainty −0.01 (0.01) [−0.04; 0.01] 0.19 (0.02) [0.15; 0.22] −0.17 (0.02) [−0.21; −0.14]
Asset specificity
Unilateral investments 0.02 (0.02) [−0.01; 0.01] −0.03 (0.02) [−0.08; 0.01] 0.01 (0.02) [−0.03; 0.06]
Mutual investments −0.01 (0.02) [−0.05; 0.02] 0.02 (0.02) [−0.02; 0.01] −0.01 (0.02) [−0.06; 0.03]
Notes. Marginal effects (standard errors s.e. in parentheses) [95% confidence intervals in brackets]. Marginal effects (for factorial
variables) represent the discrete change from the base level, which is 0, to 1; note that for asset specificity the base level is “no specific
investments.” P-S = Partner-Specific.
discriminating effect of p-s trust and p-s value cer-
tainty on alliances over acquisitions; however, these
differences between early and later models were
small. We interpret these results as supportive for
our theory and the scenario experiment’s validity,
and as helpful for understanding the functioning of
the experiment. We report the p-s trust, p-s routines,
and p-s value certainty coefficients of these analyses
in Appendix C.
Discussion and Conclusion
While a growing body of research has consid-
ered the relevance of prior p-s experiences in pre-
dicting future alliances/acquisitions, the presumed
theoretical mechanisms and the empirical findings
have been surprisingly divergent. We sought to
provide additional clarity to this situation by (a)
explicitly addressing three alternative mechanisms
through which prior p-s experience can affect future
alliances and/or acquisitions, and (b) operationaliz-
ing and rigorously testing our mechanism-level pre-
dictions with a policy-capturing methodology.
In terms of the three key mechanisms (p-s trust,
p-s routines and p-s value certainty), we found,
as predicted, that p-s trust facilitates subsequent
alliances and acquisitions, and that the effect is
significantly stronger for alliance (vs. acquisition).
We also found that the presence of p-s routines
triggers both subsequent alliance and subsequent
acquisition choices (and is an equally strong
predictor of each). Finally, we found that p-s value
certainty motivates later alliances and acquisi-
tions, and does so more strongly for acquisitions
versus alliances (as predicted). Taken together,
our results highlight that future research would
benefit from a more explicit consideration of the
heterogeneity in prior alliance experiences. Indeed,
our results suggest that a failure to consider – both
theoretically and empirically – the alternative
mechanisms through which prior alliance experi-
ences influence future interfirm combinations may
mask significantly different effects. While reliance
on simple counts of prior alliance experiences
can be justified in earlier work, we suggest that
future research should endeavor to better match
presumed theoretical mechanisms with specific
alternative empirical operationalizations of those
mechanisms.
In terms of the managerial relevance of our
study, we see our study as addressing a simple
but important question: Given that the “shadow of
the past” experiences will likely loom large when
considering current decisions (e.g., whether to do
an alliance or acquisition), what are the particu-
larly relevant aspects of those prior experiences,
and how can we improve managerial – or even
investor – decision making as a result of knowing
this? We see our approach, method, and findings
as offering assistance in helping senior managers
(and boards) avoid bad decisions. For example, the
board of Firm A, when asked by a senior-level man-
ager to “green-light” a new alliance with Firm B
(with whom Firm A had a prior alliance), would
be advised to probe the nature of that prior rela-
tionship and ask about the specifics of that prior
relationship (i.e., Was it high-trust? Were working
routines built? What did we specifically learn about
the value they offer?) One should not expect to see
a simple learning-by-doing effect, given the hetero-
geneity involved in the doing.
In terms of limitations and future extensions of
our study, we acknowledge that our methodologi-
cal approach meant limits on how many cues we
could use and manipulate (hence our focus on three
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fundamental mechanisms that have individually or
collectively been considered in prior research). We
endeavored to provide our key informants with a
realistic and meaningful decision context. Given
the importance in policy-capturing studies of incor-
porating managerial characteristics into strategic
choice models, we assembled an expert panel and
included individual-level control variables in our
study. However, given that policy-capturing stud-
ies rely on hypothetical decision-making scenarios,
we cannot rule out possible differences with actual
decision-making situations in the business world
(external validity).
In terms of how our work can spur new research,
we see a number of future research avenues: First,
the strength of our findings and our focus on spe-
cific mechanisms suggest a likely benefit to opening
the “black box” of partner-specific alliance expe-
rience even wider to consider additional contex-
tual and firm-specific characteristics. This echoes
recent calls for more contingency models in this
area of strategy research (Steensma & Corley, 2001;
Van de Vrande et al., 2009; Villalonga & McGa-
han, 2005). Future research could also investigate
some of our partner-specific alliance experience
mechanisms in greater depth. For example, might
different types of trust, e.g., ability-, benevolence-
or integrity-based trust (R. C. Mayer et al., 1995)
have the same effect on the alliance vs. acqui-
sition decision? When might distrust drive deci-
sions towards acquisitions vs. leading to alliances
with more detailed contracts and exit options? One
could also consider more fine-grained governance
choice variables that distinguish between acquisi-
tions, equity-based alliances (such as joint ventures)
and non-equity/contractual alliances (Dyer, Kale, &
Singh, 2004).
We also hope that our use of the policy-capturing
method, with its potential for a more rigorous
research design, would also contribute to the
methodological plurality in the arena of alliance
and acquisition research. Finally, and more gener-
ally, we hope that our approach motivates strategy
and organizational researchers to discuss more
specifically and precisely which theoretical mecha-
nisms are presumed to be driving their predictions.
Moving closer to mechanism-based explanations
(with distinct measures for each) could represent an
important advance for strategic management schol-
ars interested in explanation and understanding, as
well as prediction.
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Appendix A
Results from t-tests and ICC analyses
Mean rank differences







P-S trust −1.59 (.00) 0.53 (.00) −0.03 (.44) −0.35 (.02)
P-S routines 2.11 (.00) 1.56 (.00) 1.24 (.00)
P-S value certainty −0.55 (.00) −0.88 (.00)
Market uncertainty −0.33 (.02)
Notes. N = 160; estimates are mean differences; exact p-values (from paired t-tests) in parentheses. P-S= Partner-Specific.
ICC analysis ICC(1,1)
12 scenarios 0.11 (.00)
ICC analyses (scenarios and blocks) ICC(2,1)
12 scenarios in block 1 0.13 (.00)
12 scenarios in block 2 0.14 (.00)
12 scenarios in block 3 0.11 (.00)
12 scenarios in block 4 0.12 (.00)
Notes. N = 160; 12 scenarios (ICC[1,1]) nested in four blocks (ICC[2,1]); exact p-values in parentheses. ICC= Intraclass Correlation
Coefficient.
Appendix B
Population of 3 × 24 = 48 scenarios and incomplete blocks
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
00000 01000 00010 01010
00001 01001 00011 01011
00002 01002 00012 01012
00110 01110 00100 01100
00111 01111 00101 01101
00112 01112 00102 01102
11000 10010 11010 10000
11001 10011 11011 10001
11002 10012 11012 10002
11110 10100 11100 10110
11111 10101 11101 10111
11112 10102 11102 10112
Notes. Digits (in order of appearance) refer to p-s trust, p-s routines, p-s value certainty, market uncertainty, and asset specificity; levels
are low (0) and high (1) for the first four variables, and no (0), unilateral (1), and mutual investments (2) for asset specificity. Each block
contributes equally to all factors, such that all main effects can be estimated free from block effects.
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Appendix C
Results of start-up and fatigue effects analyses
Variable Position Alliance vs. no decision Acquisition vs. no decision Alliance vs. acquisition
P-S trust 01 1.49 (0.60) [0.31; 2.67] 0.66 (0.64) [−0.60; 1.92] 0.82 (0.47) [−0.10; 1.75]
02 1.35 (0.79) [−0.20; 2.90] 1.15 (0.78) [−0.38; 2.69] 0.20 (0.45) [−0.68; 1.07]
03 1.90 (0.58) [0.78; 3.03] 1.58 (0.64) [0.33; 2.82] 0.32 (0.47) [−0.60; 1.24]
04 1.54 (0.67) [0.23; 2.86] 1.47 (0.67) [0.15; 2.79] 0.07 (0.47) [−0.85; 1.00]
05 2.48 (0.69) [1.13; 3.84] 2.97 (0.74) [1.52; 4.42] −0.49 (0.51) [−1.49; 0.52]
06 1.74 (0.59) [0.58; 2.90] 0.81 (0.58) [−0.33; 1.94] 0.93 (0.52) [−0.08; 1.94]
07 1.33 (0.60) [0.15; 2.50] 1.01 (0.64) [−0.24; 2.26] 0.31 (0.54) [−0.74; 1.37]
08 1.75 (0.54) [0.69; 2.81] 1.03 (0.59) [−0.12; 2.19] 0.72 (0.47) [−0.19; 1.64]
09 2.68 (0.70) [1.30; 4.06] 1.81 (0.72) [0.39; 3.22] 0.87 (0.46) [−0.04; 1.78]
10 2.63 (0.63) [1.40; 3.85] 2.25 (0.72) [0.84; 3.67] 0.37 (0.53) [−0.68; 1.42]
11 3.41 (0.74) [1.97; 4.86] 2.39 (0.69) [1.02; 3.75] 1.03 (0.58) [−0.11; 2.17]
12 2.06 (0.60) [0.89; 3.23] 0.81 (0.59) [−0.34; 1.97] 1.24 (0.51) [0.24; 2.25]
P-S routines 01 1.61 (0.62) [0.39; 2.83] 1.61 (0.67) [0.31; 2.92] −0.00 (0.46) [−0.91; 0.91]
02 2.21 (0.77) [0.69; 3.72] 1.62 (0.78) [0.10; 3.14] 0.59 (0.43) [−0.26; 1.44]
03 0.83 (0.59) [−0.33; 1.99] 0.80 (0.65) [−0.48; 2.08] 0.03 (0.47) [−0.88; 0.95]
04 1.19 (0.58) [0.05; 2.34] 0.42 (0.60) [−0.75; 1.59] 0.77 (0.44) [−0.10; 1.63]
05 1.45 (0.71) [0.06; 2.83] 1.25 (0.74) [−0.20; 2.70] 0.19 (0.54) [−0.86; 1.25]
06 1.64 (0.60) [0.46; 2.81] 0.94 (0.58) [−0.19; 2.07] 0.70 (0.52) [−0.31; 1.71]
07 2.00 (0.59) [0.84; 3.15] 1.90 (0.65) [0.62; 3.18] 0.10 (0.52) [−0.92; 1.12]
08 0.72 (0.55) [−0.37; 1.80] 0.79 (0.60) [−0.39; 1.96] −0.07 (0.47) [−0.99; 0.85]
09 2.04 (0.73) [0.61; 3.48] 2.15 (0.75) [0.68; 3.63] −0.11 (0.46) [−1.02; 0.80]
10 1.21 (0.59) [0.06; 2.35] 2.10 (0.69) [0.74; 3.46] −0.89 (0.54) [−1.94; 0.16]
11 0.81 (0.73) [−0.62; 2.24] 0.90 (0.68) [−0.43; 2.22] −0.08 (0.56) [−1.18; 1.02]
12 1.76 (0.59) [0.61; 2.91] 1.04 (0.58) [−0.10; 2.19] 0.72 (0.50) [−0.26; 1.70]
P-S value 01 0.62 (0.61) [−0.58; 1.82] 1.20 (0.66) [−0.10; 2.50] −0.58 (0.49) [−1.53; 0.38]
02 1.02 (0.67) [−0.30; 2.34] 1.89 (0.66) [0.59; 3.19] −0.87 (0.45) [−1.75; 0.01]
03 0.74 (0.56) [−0.36; 1.83] 2.18 (0.64) [0.92; 3.43] −1.44 (0.50) [−2.42; −0.46]
04 2.44 (0.67) [1.13; 3.75] 2.71 (0.66) [1.42; 4.00] −0.27 (0.48) [−1.21; 0.67]
05 1.30 (0.60) [0.11; 2.48] 2.10 (0.64) [0.84; 3.35] −0.80 (0.49) [−1.76; 0.16]
06 1.92 (0.64) [0.66; 3.18] 2.31 (0.61) [1.10; 3.51] −0.38 (0.55) [−1.46; 0.69]
07 1.21 (0.57) [0.09; 2.34] 2.19 (0.65) [0.93; 3.46] −0.98 (0.53) [−2.01; 0.05]
08 0.99 (0.57) [−0.12; 2.10] 1.57 (0.60) [0.39; 2.75] −0.58 (0.48) [−1.52; 0.36]
09 1.61 (0.57) [0.48; 2.73] 1.47 (0.58) [0.33; 2.60] 0.14 (0.46) [−0.77; 1.05]
10 1.68 (0.60) [0.51; 2.86] 3.82 (0.71) [2.42; 5.23] −2.14 (0.57) [−3.25; −1.03]
11 −0.29 (0.65) [−1.57; 0.99] 1.43 (0.56) [0.32; 2.53] −1.72 (0.55) [−2.79; −0.65]
12 0.41 (0.56) [−0.69; 1.50] 1.09 (0.56) [−0.00; 2.19] −0.68 (0.48) [−1.62; 0.26]
Notes. Raw coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) [95% confidence intervals in brackets]. Estimates are taken from 12 separate
multinomial logistic regression models. All models contain the market uncertainty and asset specificity variables plus the full set of
covariates (gender, professional experience, experience in M&A, managerial position, narcissism, block). All full tables are available
upon request. P-S= Partner-Specific.
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